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Abstract
Welfare opinion research has traditionally viewed migration as a potential hazard for 
welfare solidarity. In this article, we argue that while increased presence of foreign-
ers can indeed make some people less supportive of public welfare provision in gen-
eral or trigger opposition to migrants’ social rights, the link between migration and 
solidarity is not universally a negative one. Instead, many people can combine sup-
port for migration with high preferences for comprehensive social protection; others 
can endorse migration while they are not particularly supportive of an all-encom-
passing welfare state. Based on this line of reasoning we construct a taxonomy of 
four ideal types of welfare solidarity that are present in contemporary European wel-
fare states. To illustrate the usefulness of this heuristic tool, we apply Latent Class 
Factor Analysis to European Social Survey round 8 data. We find that the majority 
of Europeans (56%) combine strong support for both migration and the welfare state 
(extended solidarity). However, exclusive solidarity is also widely spread as over a 
quarter of respondents (28%) oppose migration while expressing strong support for 
the welfare state. People who oppose migration and have relatively low preference 
for the welfare state (diminished solidarity) represent a small minority (5%). A lit-
tle more than a tenth (11%) of Europeans endorse migration, but express relatively 
low support for the welfare state, which we assume to be a reflection of cosmopoli-
tan solidarity. Despite considerable variation in the incidence of the four solidarities 
across countries, the preference structure is the same for all. Further, we find that at 
the individual level, the propensity to hold one of these types of solidarities is influ-
enced by social trust, citizenship and country of birth, financial situation, education, 
and residence type. However, the extent of migration and social spending do not 
appear to be related with the propensity of holding either type of solidarity as the 
liberal’s dilemma and the welfare chauvinism theories would predict.
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Introduction
Until recently, welfare solidarity was by and large a national phenomenon in 
Europe. Old-age pensions, sickness and disability insurance, unemployment ben-
efits, family transfers and social services represented an embodiment of insti-
tutionalised forms of national solidarity as they were designed to redistribute 
resources (Kymlicka 2015; Swaan 1992). These services were financed through 
taxes or by social insurances, therefore redistributing both horizontally, i.e. across 
the life cycle, and vertically, i.e. from rich to poor. The aim of those welfare sys-
tems was to meet the needs of fellow citizens when they experienced various 
types of contingencies.
In the light of globalisation, and especially increasing migration, national wel-
fare solidarity as the cornerstone of European welfare states is challenged. With 
European countries growing more and more culturally diverse, it is increasingly 
evident that maintaining broad support for welfare programmes also necessi-
tates a rather strong sense of solidarity towards migrants—a concern for their 
wellbeing and a willingness to share resources traditionally confined to natives. 
However, the present welfare state scholarship is generally sceptical about such 
extended solidarity; instead, migration is analysed as a potential threat for the 
support for the welfare state. In this respect, two seemingly competing theories 
are particularly important: the ‘liberal’s dilemma’ and ‘welfare chauvinism’. The 
first states that the welfare state bases on strong solidarity with fellow citizens 
which is compromised when societies become more diverse. As a result, support 
for the welfare state is undermined among natives. Thus, liberal politicians (or 
in European context, social-democrats), as champions of universal social rights, 
are torn between preference for a strong welfare system or for openness towards 
migrants in order not to lose their core electorate, hence the name ‘liberal’s 
dilemma’. The second, welfare chauvinism theory, states that people do not like 
to share resources with ‘outsiders’, but they do want to maintain benefits they are 
accustomed to. Hence, they are against opening the welfare system to migrants 
(or even against migration in general). Both theories assume a negative relation-
ship between migration and welfare. So far, they have been tested separately and 
the evidence is mixed.
In this article, we argue that in the age of mass migration, a unidimensional 
approach of testing the presence of a negative link between migration and wel-
fare solidarity is not sufficient to capture the complex relation between the two 
phenomena. Certainly, we do acknowledge that an influx of sizable numbers of 
foreigners can lead to a ‘diminished solidarity’ (manifest in opposition to migra-
tion and relatively low support for the welfare state) or to an ‘exclusive solidarity’ 
(reflected in a combination of strong welfare preferences alongside opposition to 
migration and migrants’ social rights) among some people. However, we propose 
that migration can also lead to an ‘extended solidarity’, whereby people simul-
taneously express preference for a strong welfare state and a concern and sup-
port for migrants. Furthermore, there are a number of solid theoretical reasons 
for why some people will endorse migration even though they are not particularly 
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in favour of a strong welfare state. We term this as a ‘cosmopolitan solidarity’. In 
sum, we propose a four-fold typology of welfare solidarity as a more complete 
heuristic tool to understand the relation between migration and welfare solidarity. 
To demonstrate its usefulness, we apply Latent Class Factor Analysis to European 
Social Survey round 8 data. Furthermore, we explore how the prevalence of the 
four ideal types of solidarity varies across the countries. We then use multilevel 
multinomial models to show how the individual propensity to belong to one of 
these solidarity groups is related to a range of individual-level socio-economic 
factors. Finally, we test the two theories, the liberal’s dilemma and the welfare 
chauvinism, regarding their hypotheses on the effects of country-level factors on 
the interaction of attitudes towards migration and the welfare state.
The article is structured as follows: we first review the theories and the literature 
that link solidarity and migration and develop the four-fold taxonomy of solidarity. 
Next we formulate several hypotheses to be tested empirically. Then we explain the 
data and the methodology that we apply. The next section presents the results of data 
analysis and the conclusion section sums up the key findings.
Solidarity and migration: theory and evidence
Accentuated by pressure created in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, 
increasing migration challenges national welfare states all over Europe. Migration 
can be seen as a particular risk for the principle of solidarity upon which all modern 
welfare states are based. According to this principle, a welfare state’s society should 
be characterised by a positive bond between the fates of different people (de Beer 
and Koster 2009, p. 15). This positive bond might be driven by self-interests (do ut 
des) or/and by ideological beliefs, such as the support for the values of justice and 
reciprocity (unus pro omnibus, omnes pro uno). The welfare state can thus be per-
ceived as an extensive form of organised and compulsory solidarity.
While support for the welfare state for a long time meant solidarity with fellow 
vulnerable citizens (e.g. the poor, the sick, the unemployed, and the elderly, see 
Baldwin 1990) or with citizens with high compulsory expenditures (e.g. families 
with children, see the new social risks identified by Taylor-Gooby 2004 and Bonoli 
2006), nowadays it also necessitates feelings of solidarity with migrants. This new 
reality poses questions on the welfare deservingness of migrants as they did not 
spend their whole (working) life in the country.
The present literature offers two main theoretical perspectives regarding how 
Europeans’ attitudes towards the welfare state may relate to increasing migration 
flows: the liberal’s dilemma and welfare chauvinism. The first argues that a strong 
sense of solidarity and trust in fellow citizens is the cornerstone of the welfare state 
as it requires people to regularly pay large portions of their income to finance wel-
fare entitlements from which they themselves may never benefit directly (such as 
social assistance and unemployment benefits) or will do so only after many decades 
of contribution (such as old-age pensions, see e.g. Goodhart 2004; Kymlicka and 
Banting 2006). In the face of large-scale migration and resulting increased heteroge-
neity of European societies support for the welfare state plummets as native citizens 
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become less willing to share resources with people with whom they do not identify 
and whom they distrust. The typical argument refers to the USA, where racial het-
erogeneity is theorised to have deterred the development of a European-style com-
prehensive welfare state (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Gilens 1999). Another strand of 
argumentation states that people may also become less sympathetic to the welfare 
state if they think that it attracts migrants (for ‘welfare magnet theory’ see Borjas 
1999). Hence, it is proposed that progressive politicians in European welfare states 
are confronted with a trade-off between supporting either a generous welfare state 
or migration, commonly referred to as the ‘New Liberal Dilemma’ or ‘Progressives’ 
Dilemma’ (Goodhart 2004; Kulin et al. 2016; Kymlicka 2015; Kymlicka and Bant-
ing 2006; Newton 2007).
The evidence on liberal’s dilemma being reflected in welfare attitudes is inde-
cisive. In a study of 17 European countries, Mau and Burkhardt (2009) found that 
ethnic diversity, and especially the proportion of non-Western foreigners has weak, 
yet statistically significant negative effect on support for redistribution and equal 
rights for migrants. In addition, Breznau and Eger (2016) and Eger and Breznau 
(2017) found that support for redistribution and public welfare provision was lower 
in European countries with higher shares of foreign-born population. In contrast, in 
a sample of 91 countries at different levels of economic development, Steele (2016) 
did not detect a negative correlation between ethnic diversity and support for redis-
tributive social spending, though in countries with large inequalities an increase in 
the size of migrant groups was associated with less support for redistribution. Simi-
larly, Senik et al. (2009) found no correlation between perceived extent of migration 
and support for redistribution in a sample of 22 European countries. Furthermore, 
Breznau and Eger (2016) could not replicate their finding on the country level that 
a higher share of migrants is linked with lower support for welfare provision on the 
regional level.
The second theoretical perspective, the concept of welfare chauvinism, also 
shares the notion that people are less willing to share resources with ‘outsiders’ 
compared to their ‘in-group’. However, rather than undermining support for the wel-
fare state as a whole (and especially for the universal and contributory entitlements), 
people are expected to oppose the extension of welfare rights to migrants (Cappelen 
and Peters 2018).1 With growing migration, it is argued, natives, especially those 
that rely heavily on the welfare state, increasingly fear that their share of the pie is 
being contested by a new group (see the ‘group competition’ theory, e.g., Blalock 
1967; Coser 1956). In addition to migrants having a different identity, opposition 
to their obtaining social rights can also be explained by migrants scoring low on 
key deservingness criteria, such as reciprocity (they have contributed less in taxes 
than natives) and control (moving to another country is perceived to be a voluntary 
action, see van Oorschot 2006). Furthermore, the theory assumes that the higher 
the spending of the welfare state, the more the natives have to lose if increasing 
1 A softer version of welfare chauvinism implies support for granting social rights to migrants only after 
they have met certain criteria, such as working and paying taxes or becoming citizens (Reeskens and van 
Oorschot 2012).
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migration leads to welfare retrenchment (see, critical of this argument, van Oorschot 
and Uunk 2007).
Unlike the liberal’s dilemma, the existence of welfare chauvinism as such is 
not contested, presumably as opposition to migrants’ social rights is more easily 
observable than change in attitudes towards the welfare state which may or may 
not be caused by opposition to migration. However, empirical evidence concerning 
the assumption that the scale of migration and the generosity of the welfare state 
increase welfare chauvinism is not unequivocal.
Regarding the effects of migration on welfare chauvinism, Gorodzeisky and 
Semyonov (2009) found in their analysis covering 21 European countries that sup-
port for restricting migration and opposition to equal rights for migrants was higher 
in countries with larger shares of non-European foreigners. In a time-series anal-
ysis of 17 European countries between 2002 and 2007, Meuleman et  al. (2009) 
also found that higher inflow of migrants was associated with hardened attitudes 
towards migration. In contrast, the results from Cappelen and Peters’ (2018) study 
of 21 European countries show that welfare chauvinism is lower in countries with 
higher levels of intra-EU migration, though it was also found that higher migra-
tion from Eastern European countries was associated with more welfare chauvin-
ism. Likewise, Eger and Breznau’s (2017) analysis suggests that a higher proportion 
of migrants reduces welfare chauvinism even though this also correlates with less 
support for public welfare provision and redistribution. Further, Van Der Waal et al. 
(2013) did not detect an effect of ethnic heterogeneity on welfare chauvinism in 10 
European countries and Koning (2013) does not find a relationship between immi-
grant welfare dependency and welfare chauvinism.
In the case of the effects of social spending, the evidence appears more consistent, 
but is in contradiction to welfare chauvinism theory. Mewes and Mau (2013) found 
that in a sample of 26 European countries, higher social protection expenditure was 
associated with less welfare chauvinism. Similarly, in a study of 15 advanced wel-
fare states Crepaz and Damron (2009) found that higher degree of decommodifica-
tion and social spending was correlated with less welfare chauvinism. Furthermore, 
Reeskens and van Oorschot (2012) found that in 24 European countries higher social 
expenditure was associated with lower preference for excluding migrants completely 
from welfare provision.
Summing up the two main theoretical positions on preferences for the welfare 
state in the context of increasing migration, we argue that these positions are not 
necessarily competing theories explaining the same phenomenon. Instead, it is more 
fruitful to think of them as two distinctive types of negative reactions that people 
may have to the same phenomenon; for some, the whole concept of the welfare state 
is devalued because of migration (diminished solidarity), while others just want to 
continue business as usual by restricting migrants’ access to welfare benefits (exclu-
sive solidarity).
However, we claim that it would be erroneous to consider that migration can only 
undermine welfare solidarity in one way or another. Instead, we suggest that the two 
separate dimensions—national solidarity and openness to migration—can interact 
at the individual level in different ways. Thus, we complement the two types of atti-
tudes on the interrelation of migration and welfare state with two other types equally 
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likely to exist: ‘extended solidarity’ and ‘cosmopolitan solidarity’. Such a taxonomy 
of four ideal types reflects the two-dimensional phenomenon more precisely and 
will thus render the analysis of the interrelation of attitudes towards migration and 
the welfare state more adequate. The two additional types are based on the following 
theoretical reflections:
First, research on egalitarianism has shown that egalitarians express strong sup-
port for the welfare state (Andreß and Heien 2001; Blekesaune and Quadagno 
2003). At the same time, they are also shown to be open for migrants (Mau and Bur-
khardt 2009). Taking the two strands of research together, it follows that for people 
with an egalitarian worldview, both the welfare state and migration are remedies for 
social injustices. At the country level, more comprehensive welfare states can create 
a society showing more solidarity that includes migrants, for example because peo-
ple feel less competition with migrants due to the guarantee of social security (van 
Oorschot and Uunk 2007). Similarly, in more diverse societies, negative stereotypes 
diminish due to increasing inter-group contact, leading to a more accommodating 
attitude towards migrants’ social rights (Cappelen and Peters 2018; Mewes and Mau 
2013). We therefore expect that a sizable share of people in European countries will 
simultaneously be in favour of a comprehensive welfare state and open to migration, 
thus resulting in an ‘extended solidarity’.
Second, some people feel that it is the duty of the society to look after those 
members who experience hardship, thus taking a humanitarian stance (Feldman and 
Steenbergen 2001). People adopt humanitarian values even when suspicious of an 
all-penetrating state and redistribution of incomes. Since migrants often are consid-
erably poorer than native-born citizens and they often flee appalling political, eco-
nomic and social conditions in their countries, it is natural that they should attract 
empathy from people with humanitarian sentiments irrespective of the latter’s ideas 
about the role of the state in the economy (Emmenegger and Klemmensen 2013). 
Further, economically well-off migrants, such as ‘expats’ working with interna-
tional companies, will not create extra costs for the welfare state; quite the opposite, 
they will contribute to it. Thus, the belief in equality of opportunity and contempt 
for ethno-racial discrimination is characteristic not only for egalitarian people, but 
also for people who cherish meritocracy and individualism. Finally, Europeans are 
becoming increasingly aware of the demographic challenges arising from declining 
fertility rates and their possible repercussions, which is likely to make them more 
receptive to migration as a possible remedy, especially if they have an ideologi-
cal viewpoint that combines humanitarianism with meritocracy and individualism. 
Thus, we anticipate that another group of people in European countries will hold 
positive views about migrants and their social rights even though they do not pos-
sess a particularly strong attachment to the welfare state, leading to a ‘cosmopolitan 
solidarity’.
Following these arguments, we propose that there are four types of welfare soli-
darity in present European welfare states: cosmopolitan, diminished, exclusive and 
extended. The advantage of this theoretical framework over previous research based 
on regression analysis is that our approach does not concentrate on a single negative 
link between migration and welfare solidarity and therefore does not seek to aver-
age out the effects into a single parameter. Instead, it allows for multiple types of 
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combinations of the two phenomena at individual level. This is important as a small, 
but well-organised group of people with diminished or exclusive solidarity can exert 
political pressure for welfare retrenchment or restriction of migrants’ access to the 
welfare system even when on average a society is in favour of a strong welfare state 
and is open to migrants.
As far as we are aware, there is only one study which uses a similar non-linear 
approach for establishing the relation between attitudes towards migration and the 
welfare state. Kulin et al. (2016) applied Latent Class Analysis method to ESS4 data 
to classify respondents based on their attitudes towards: (a) redistribution of income 
between rich and poor; (b) allowing additional migration into their countries; and 
(c) social rights of migrants. They identified five groups—‘pro-welfare, anti-migra-
tion’, ‘exclusive’, ‘pro-welfare, pro-migration’, ‘anti-welfare, anti-migration’, and 
‘inclusive’.
While we share the idea of non-linear relation between welfare and migration 
attitudes, we believe that this study has a number of conceptual and methodological 
limitations, which we try to avoid in our own analysis. First, attitudes towards redis-
tribution between rich and poor is not a very accurate proxy of attitudes towards the 
welfare state in general; as pointed out by Barr (2001), most of the redistribution that 
occurs in welfare states is horizontal, across life-cycle, rather than between income 
groups. Therefore, people’s opinions about vertical redistribution cannot be treated 
as an indication of their general attitude towards a complex, multifaceted institution 
that also serves other critical functions such as the management of social risks and 
uncertainty. Second, using openness to additional migration and attitudes towards 
migrants’ social rights as separate dimensions reflects an implicit assumption that 
the two are orthogonal—which is very unlikely to be the case. In our own analysis 
we found that general attitudes towards migrants and their social rights form a single 
latent factor. Third, Kulin and colleagues’ results are very likely to be influenced 
by their choices of cut-off points made when dichotomising their categorical vari-
ables. Fourth, two groups identified by Kulin and colleagues—‘inclusive’ and ‘pro-
welfare, pro-migration’—appear to be very similar in all respects with the exception 
that the latter want to grant social rights to migrants after they have contributed to 
the welfare system through paying taxes, while the former do not require such a con-
ditionality. We believe that contribution requirement is not necessarily a sign of hav-
ing reservations against migrants—access to most welfare benefits is conditional on 
previous contributions for native citizens as well. Thus, it seems appropriate to treat 
‘inclusive’ and ‘pro-welfare, pro-migration’ groups as a single one, which would 
correspond to the extended solidarity group in our classification. We thus refine 
their previous exploratory insights with a theory-driven and methodologically more 
rigid approach.
Research hypotheses
To illustrate the practicality of our taxonomy our first task is to verify that each of the 
proposed ideal types is represented by a substantial number of persons both across 
the European continent and in individual countries. Second, we need to understand 
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how the propensity of holding each type of solidarity is influenced by individual- 
and country-level factors. Even though the theories presented above focus on the 
country-level, they also provide important clues regarding how various individual 
characteristics may render people more likely to hold one of the four solidarities.
Recalling that the liberal’s dilemma is expected to materialise through ethnic 
diversity diminishing mutual trust among citizens and, as a consequence, less social 
trust leading to less solidarity, our first hypothesis is that lower social trust will be 
correlated with higher odds of having diminished solidarity (H1).
The welfare chauvinism theory, on the other hand, suggests that citizens and 
especially those born in the country want to exclude migrants from benefits. Also, 
the group competition theory assumes that persons threatened by migrants, i.e. those 
who benefit from social security and those less well-off are more likely to adopt 
the values of exclusive solidarity. Hence, our second hypothesis is that compared to 
people with opposite characteristics, citizens, natives, unemployed and those who 
expect to be unemployed soon, financially insecure people and those whose primary 
source of income is social transfers will be more likely to hold an exclusive solidar-
ity compared to other solidarity types (H2).
In line with enlightenment theory (Robinson and Bell 1995), our expectation is 
that people with higher education are more likely to hold universalist values, which 
should render them more likely to show an extended solidarity rather than other 
types of solidarity (H3).
Finally, we assume that individualistic, meritocratic and cosmopolitan values are 
more widespread in big cities than elsewhere. Therefore, our fourth hypothesis is 
that urban people will be more likely to express a cosmopolitan solidarity than other 
solidarity types compared to people residing in other locations (H4).
Turning to country-level factors, our fifth hypothesis with the goal of testing the 
liberal’s dilemma theory is that a higher stock of migrants (or refugees) will be cor-
related with a higher probability of having diminished solidarity compared to other 
solidarity types (H5).
Similarly, with the sixth hypothesis we test the welfare chauvinism theory and its 
assumptions regarding migration flow, expecting that a higher inflow of migrants 
will be associated with a higher propensity of having exclusive solidarity compared 
to other types (H6).
Further, still on the welfare chauvinism theory but now testing its assumptions 
regarding welfare spending, our final hypothesis states that higher social protection 
spending will be correlated with a higher probability of expressing exclusive soli-
darity compared to other solidarity types (H7).
Methodology
Data
This paper utilizes the data of the eighth round of the European Social Survey (ESS) 
conducted in 2016. The ESS is an academically driven cross-sectional survey that 
collects data on attitudes, beliefs, and behavioural patterns through face-to-face 
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interviews every two years. The eighth wave of the ESS was fielded in 23 countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom) and 
offers nationally representative samples of at least 1250 respondents per country.2 
The eighth wave contains a rotating module on welfare attitudes with multiple ques-
tions about various aspects of the welfare state, while also including a set of items 
concerning attitudes towards migrants. These unique features make the ESS8 a data-
set of choice for the purpose of our research. In all analyses, we use design survey 
weights supplied by the ESS.
Dependent variables
While it is now commonly acknowledged that attitudes towards the welfare state 
are multidimensional (Roosma et al. 2012), it has been argued that the dimension 
that comes closest to measuring the underlying concept of ‘welfarism’ is preferences 
for the range of government responsibilities for different types of welfare trans-
fers and services (van Oorschot and Meuleman 2012). Accordingly, our first latent 
variable—preference for welfare provision (i.e. national solidarity)—is measured 
using three observed variables (A-C) concerning people’s preference for the role of 
the government in welfare provision. The question reads (letters in square brackets 
Fig. 1  Conceptual model
2 The only exception is Iceland, where the sample size of 880 reflects its small size of population. For 
more detailed information about the ESS see: https ://www.europ eanso cials urvey .org/.
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indicate the variable’s position in Fig. 1): “People have different views on what the 
responsibilities of governments should or should not be. For each of the tasks I read 
out please tell me on a score of 0–10 how much responsibility you think govern-
ments should have. 0 means it should not be governments’ responsibility at all and 
10 means it should be entirely governments’ responsibility. Firstly to …
• [A] …ensure a reasonable standard of living for the old?”
• [B] …ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed?”
• [C] …ensure sufficient childcare services for working parents?”
  The second latent variable—openness to migrants—is measured using four 
observed variables:
• [D] “When do you think they [people coming from other countries] should 
obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living 
here?”
• [E] “Is it generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that people come to live 
here from other countries?”
• [F] “Is [country]’s cultural life generally undermined or enriched by people com-
ing to live here from other countries?”
• [G] “Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live 
here from other countries?”
The fourth variable (D) is measured by five response categories (in order of 
increasing support): (1) they should never get the same rights; (2) once they have 
become a citizen; (3) only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year; 
(4) after living in a country for a year, whether or not they have worked and paid 
taxes; (5) immediately on arrival. The last three variables (E–G) are measured on 
a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 indicating the most negative attitude and 10 the most 
positive.
Independent variables: individual level
In the analysis, we use the following individual-level variables. Trust in people is 
measured through a question which asks respondents whether “Most people can be 
trusted or you can’t be too careful in dealing with people”. Responses are measured 
on a 10-point scale with higher values implying higher trust. Being born in the coun-
try and being citizen are binary variables. Respondent’s employment status catego-
ries are: paid work; in education; unemployed; economically inactive; permanently 
sick or disabled; retired; housework, looking after children; and other. Answer cat-
egories for perceived likelihood of unemployment in the coming 12 months are: not 
at all likely; not very likely; likely; very likely; never worked or no longer working. 
Feeling about household income has four categories: living comfortably on present 
income; coping on present income; difficult on present income; and very difficult on 
present income. Main sources of household income are: wages, other market income 
and informal transfers; social transfers; and other. Education status comprises of 
three categories: lower secondary; upper secondary; tertiary. Place of residence 
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differentiates between: a big city; the suburbs or outskirts of a big city; a town or a 
small city; a country village; a farm or home in the countryside. We also control for 
age (in years) and gender.
Independent variables: country level
To capture the different dimensions of migration, we use three indicators in the anal-
ysis: The stock of refugees is the number of refugees divided by the total popula-
tion. The stock of migrants is the share of people in country who have been born 
in another country. The flow of migrants is measured through net annual migration 
which is the difference between immigrants and emigrants divided by the total pop-
ulation. All three indicators were obtained from World Bank’s Open Data source 
(httpss://data.worldbank.org). Social protection spending is measured as a share of 
GDP and was obtained from IMF Government Finance Statistics (https ://data.imf.
org/?sk=a0867 067-d23c-4ebc-ad23-d3b01 50454 05).
Analytical strategy
In order to answer our research questions and test the proposed hypotheses about 
welfare solidarity in Europe, we make use of Latent Class Factor Analysis (LCFA; 
see Magidson and Vermunt 2001). LCFA is a specific type of an often-used Latent 
Class Cluster Analysis (LCCA), but instead of categorical observed indicators, it 
uses continuous indicators to estimate the latent clusters. In that sense, it is closer 
to factor analysis as we formulate a model with two mutually independent dichoto-
mous latent factors. This fits well our theorised dimensions of national solidarity 
and openness towards migrants, which are modelled as restricted LCFA with two 
independent dichotomous latent factors. LCFA is used as a descriptive instrument 
that operationalises and empirically describes the dispersion of people over the theo-
rised taxonomy. We prefer this method over arbitrarily dichotomising scales derived 
from observed variables according to their averages or other clustering techniques 
because it allows us to stay as close as possible to the original data and to use a 
model-based approach which is parsimonious and easy to interpret. Unlike explora-
tory LCCA, our estimated LCFA approach models the two latent factors separately 
and assigns a position for each individual on each factor.
Accordingly, in Fig. 1, national solidarity and openness towards migrants are for-
mulated as two independent latent factors, each measured by a set of observed items.
As we are dealing with a sample of observations nested within countries, we use 
the multilevel extension of latent class model proposed by Vermunt (2003, 2008). 
We apply a non-parametric multilevel latent class model that is similar to random-
coefficients logistic regression model (Agresti et al. 2000), with the difference that 
the dependent variable is not directly observed but latent. In comparison to the con-
ventional approach of multilevel modelling with random effects, we do not assume 
any particular parametric distribution of the random components (Finch and French 
2014) and hence pose less restrictive assumptions on the model (Vermunt and van 
Dijk 2001). Under the assumption that there exists a finite number of subgroups 
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with different coefficients, the model creates categorical latent country clusters that 
can be used to account for fixed country-level characteristics similar to using coun-
try dummies (see Vermunt and van Dijk 2001; Rights and Sterba 2016). However, 
unlike using country dummies that would be perfectly collinear with any country-
level predictor, our approach allows adding country-level predictors to the model. 
This is because countries are clustered in a lower number of groups that break the 
perfect collinearity and allow estimation of country-level effects.
The number of modelled latent country clusters is evaluated based on model fit 
indices. Our strategy for estimating the multilevel model is to sequentially increase 
the number of latent country clusters and evaluate the model fit. Conventionally, 
several model fit criteria are used with latent class models: the likelihood ratio 
L2 , Pearson 2 , or various information criteria (IC) indices. The former two have 
important limitations (see Hagenaars and McCutcheon 2002); especially with large 
datasets, absolute model fit criteria will almost always produce a significant result, 
which is not very informative. Moreover, model comparison significance tests are 
problematic in their own right, as the likelihood ratio statistic between two models 
is not chi-squared distributed (McLachlan and Peel 2000). Despite mentioned short-
comings, for transparency reasons, we report the log-likelihood (LL). As a second 
indicator for absolute model fit, we report estimated classification errors (to assess 
separation of the classes) for all models. For model selection, however, we rely on 
relative model fit indices, BIC and SABIC, which were shown to have more reliable 
properties for model selection (see simulation study by Nylund et al. 2007), espe-
cially if absolute fit can be considered strong for all solutions. The lower the BIC 
and SABIC, the better the model fit to the observed data.
The model has seven observed variables (A through G, shown as letters in 
Fig. 1), two latent variables (X and Y), and one grouping variable (Z). Categories of 
observed variables are denoted as i, j, k, l, m, n, o and unobserved variables as t, u, v, 
respectively. The final log-linear representation of the model is
where A
i
 is akin to intercept probability of A, and AX
it
 to factor loading (the direct 
effect) between the observed variable A and latent variable X. Finally, AZ
iv
 denotes 
the difference in intercept probability of variable A by latent country cluster Z and 
XZ
tv
 shows the difference in sizes of estimated classes of latent variable X due to 
membership in a latent country cluster Z. For more about interpretation and log-lin-
ear representation of latent class models, see Hagenaars and McCutcheon (2002). To 
assess the effect of covariates on the probability of belonging to the four modelled 
latent clusters, we use a three-step approach (see Bakk et al. 2013).
Once we reach the best model fit with regard to controlling for fixed country-level 
characteristics, we proceed with conducting sensitivity analysis to our assumptions 
about measurement equivalence across countries. Our model assumes that concepts 
of national solidarity and openness towards migrants are partially homogenous 
across the investigated countries (see Kankaraš et al. 2010). Specifically, we assume 
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(A-G) do not differ by the latent country classes (Z). We test this by first releasing 
the model assumption about independence between observed indicators (A-G), X, 




 . Subsequently, we try 
out whether we could reach a more parsimonious model by constraining intercepts 





 to be equal to 0 (this would be considered moving towards 
structural homogeneity—higher level of measurement equivalence). Evaluating the 
model fit will show whether we truly found the best fitting model and whether our 
results are dependent on our assumptions about measurement equivalence.
Results
The results section proceeds as follows: first, we present model fit criteria and 
explain the logic behind selecting our final model. Then we show the distribution 
of national solidarity and openness towards migrants within the extracted latent 
classes. Next, we present the results on the individual-level, i.e. the association of 
latent groups with socio-economic and demographic variables. In the last part, we 
test the two theories postulating a relationship between country-level migration and 
social spending and the propensity of holding one of the four solidarity types.
Model selection
Following our theoretical discussion, we estimate a model with two independent 
factors that results into four theoretically deduced clusters. In terms of model fit, the 
estimated two-factor model is a substantial improvement to the one-factor model; 
however also adding the third and fourth factors provide marginal improvements to 
model fit compared to models with a lower number of factors. This is expected, as 
adding factors will usually result in better model fit because models with more fac-
tors have fewer restrictions. Nevertheless, adding more factors does not necessarily 
contribute to our understanding of the model. In case of three- and four-factor mod-
els, the added clusters are very low in size and are usually refinements of larger sub-
stantial theoretically based classes. We therefore decide to analyse the model with 
two factors which produces clusters of substantial size (> 5%) and remains theoreti-
cally grounded.
In the first part of Table 1 (1. Country Cluster), we iteratively increase the num-
ber of latent country clusters to account for fixed country-level characteristics. As 
can be seen, Model 4 with four country clusters has the best model fit.
We test our model assumption about measurement equivalence across the coun-
tries in the second (2. Release model assumptions) and third (3. Constrain model 
assumptions) parts of Table 1. We compare these tests to the best model we obtained 
so far (Model 4) and see that neither of these manipulations show a better model fit 
in terms of BIC and SABIC. We therefore conclude that neither of these manipula-
tions yield evidence for a different level of measurement equivalence and proceed to 
the analysis with a partially homogenous model. These tests also provide important 
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evidence for comparability of our extracted segments. Partial homogeneity means 
that although intercepts for indicators are different for each country, the loading (i.e. 
the connection) between the observed indicators and the latent factors are equal, 
hence the meaning of the factors can be considered equivalent across investigated 
countries.
National solidarity and openness towards migration
We continue the analysis by inspecting the sizes of the four latent groups that resulted 
from our LCFA analysis and whether they are clearly distinguishable in terms of the 
observed variables of the two dimensions (Table  2). The largest group comprises 
over half of all respondents (56%). These people appear to hold an extended solidar-
ity as they exhibit very high preferences for public provision of childcare and high 
support for the elderly and the unemployed. At the same time, they share a positive 
view of economic, cultural and social benefits of migration. They are also most in 
favour of extending the welfare provision to foreigners. The second group comprises 
over a quarter of the sample (28%). People in this group express even slightly higher 
support for welfare provision for fellow citizens but have rather negative opinions 
Table 2  Latent group profiles: Estimated means (and standard errors) per indicator
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about migration and are less in favour of granting social rights to migrants. Thus, 
we identify this group as the exclusive solidarity type. Slightly more than a tenth of 
respondents (11%) appear in the third group, which is much more reserved about 
the government’s role in welfare provision, but similarly to the first group, has posi-
tive attitudes towards migrants and their social rights. Therefore, this group puts for-
ward a cosmopolitan solidarity. The fourth group represents a clear minority (5%). 
It includes people with limited support for public welfare, negative attitudes towards 
migration and more clearly expressed opposition to foreigners’ social rights. There-
fore, we identify them as the diminished solidarity type. It should be noted that the 
sizes of the groups identified by us differ considerably from those in Kulin and col-
leagues’ (2016) analysis. For example, they found that ‘anti-welfare, anti-migration’ 
cluster which comes close to our diminished solidarity group comprised 14% of the 
sample. Also, their ‘pro-welfare, pro-immigration’ (22%) and ‘inclusive’ (11%) clus-
ters are considerably smaller than our extended solidarity cluster that would com-
bine the two. However, given the considerable conceptual and methodological dif-
ferences discussed earlier, as well as differences in time period and samples between 
the two studies, such differences do not seem to be surprising.
We thus find empirical support for our suggestion that the liberal’s dilemma and 
welfare chauvinism theories are neither mutually exclusive, nor do the theories cover 
the relationship between migration and support for the welfare state adequately. We 
rather find support for the two-dimensional structure including national solidarity 
and openness towards migrants leading to four ideal types of solidarity. We further-
more remark that all groups support the welfare state.3 Even in the group where 
preferences for public provision are lower, namely the cosmopolitans, support for 
each policy area is on average above the midpoint of the scale. Thus, we conclude 
that the support for general welfare provision by the state is anchored widely within 
European countries. However, there are differences in perceptions of how far the 
state should go in providing social benefits.
Individual‑level relationships
Table  3 presents the results of the multinomial multilevel logistic model fitted to 
test our hypotheses regarding the relation between individual-level predictors and 
the propensity to hold one of the four types of solidarity. The reference category is 
diminished solidarity. In line with our first hypothesis which reflects the logic of the 
liberal’s dilemma we find that lower social trust is correlated with having a higher 
propensity of having diminished solidarity compared to extensive and cosmopolitan 
solidarities. In relation to the second hypothesis regarding exclusive solidarity the 
3 Additional tests indicate that the findings for national solidarity hold as well for transnational solidar-
ity. Most respondents are in favour of a hypothetical transnational welfare system for the poor, measured 
by a question whether people are against or in favour of an EU-wide social benefit scheme for all poor 
people. However, there are important differences in the extent of rejection of such a system: 29% of peo-
ple with extended solidarity are against, vs. 36% of those holding an exclusive solidarity, 39% of those 
holding a cosmopolitan solidarity and 48% of those with a diminished solidarity.
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evidence is more mixed. While we find that, as postulated in H2, the more difficult 
people find it to live on their present income, the more likely they are to express 
exclusive solidarity than other solidarity types, it is less clear regarding natives and 
citizens, who are more likely to have not only exclusive but also diminished soli-
darity than an extended or cosmopolitan one. In addition, compared to people in 
paid work, the discouraged unemployed (i.e. those who are unemployed but do not 
look for job) are more likely to have diminished rather than exclusive solidarity. 
Even contrary to our expectation, there is no association between the main source of 
income and the propensity of having any of the four types of solidarities. The per-
ceived risk of being unemployed in the near future is also not correlated with higher 
likelihood of belonging to one of the types, the minor exception being that people 
with not very likely or very likely risk of future unemployment are more inclined 
to have cosmopolitan solidarity as opposed to diminished solidarity. To sum up, we 
find partial confirmation of our Hypothesis 2: Some, but not all variables indicating 
people having something to lose given migration are linked to exclusive solidarity; 
financial insecurity and being a citizen or a native are more likely to lead to exclu-
sive solidarity while the main source of income and risk of unemployment is not 
related to a higher propensity of exclusive solidarity.
With regard to the third hypothesis about the enlightening effects of education, 
we find that the higher the level of achieved education, the more likely people are 
to hold extended solidarity compared to exclusive or diminished ones. However, a 
higher level of education has an even slightly stronger link to having the cosmo-
politan solidarity. Similarly, in relation to the fourth hypothesis, as predicted, com-
pared to people living in other locations, people living in more urban areas appear 
more likely to have cosmopolitan solidarity than diminished solidarity. However, 
compared to other groups, urban residents also exhibit a higher likelihood of having 
extended and exclusive solidarities (as opposed to diminished solidarity) as well.
Country‑level relationships
Before inspecting the correlations between the extent of migration, welfare spending 
and propensity for holding a specific type of solidarity, it is instructive to consider 
Fig. 2  Size of latent groups by countries.  Source: own computations based on the ESS8. Notes: N of 
countries = 23. N of individuals = 43,500. Complete case analysis
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the similarities and differences in the prevalence of the solidarity types across coun-
tries. It is notable that the propensity for solidarity-types exhibits the same ordinal 
structure (i.e. Extended > Exclusive > Cosmopolitan > Diminished) in all of the 
countries as Fig. 2 shows). However, the differences are indeed still substantial and 
they follow a certain geographical pattern. At one extreme, there are Nordic and 
Western European countries—Iceland, Ireland, Sweden, Finland and the Nether-
lands, together with Lithuania—where extended solidarity forms an overwhelm-
ing majority. In these countries, more than 65% of people believe in the need for a 
strong involvement of the government in welfare provision and see various benefits 
of migration. Iceland is particularly noteworthy because 85% of respondents belong 
to this category, which is 16 percentage points higher than in Ireland, the country 
with the second highest incidence of extended solidarity. The exclusive solidarity 
constitutes the second largest group in countries with the highest share of extended 
solidarity, but their share does not exceed 25%. The other two groups represent a 
tiny proportion in these countries and diminished solidarity is practically non-exist-
ent in Iceland.
At the other extreme of Fig. 2, we find three Eastern European countries—Hun-
gary, Poland and Russia followed by Austria and Italy. In these countries, less than 
half of the population belongs to the extended solidarity type. The exclusive solidar-
ity is more prevalent in Israel (41%), Italy (37%), Poland (34%), France (34%) and 
Russia (33%). The cosmopolitans are mostly represented in Austria (19%), Hungary 
(17%), Czech Republic (15%), Switzerland (15%) and Germany (15%), while the 
diminished solidarity exceeds 10% only in Hungary.
Table 4 displays the results of the multilevel multinomial model fitted to test the 
hypotheses postulating a relationship on the country-level between the prevalence of 
a certain type of solidarity and migration and welfare spending. To control for com-
position effects, in this model, individual predictors used in the previous model are 
controlled for, but not reported as the coefficients are very similar to those discussed 
Table 4  Multilevel random-intercept model with country-level predictors
p value < 0.05 is denoted by ’ * ’ and estimated coefficients are in log-odds ratios. Individual-level pre-









Refugees, % of population  − 0.0905 (0.2839)  − 0.2121 (0.2540) 0.0906 (0.1640)
Stock of migrants, % of population 0.0122 (0.0253) 0.0290 (0.0225)  − 0.0305* (0.0144)
Net migration flow, % of population  − 0.1172 (0.0806)  − 0.0950 (0.0719)  − 0.0070 (0.0458)
Social spending, % GDP  − 0.0112 (0.0318) 0.0209 (0.0285)  − 0.0363* (0.0185)
Intercept 1.6863* (0.6649) 1.4552* (0.6000) 0.2248 (0.4144)
Random effects
Residual (π2/3) 3.29 3.29 3.29
Intercept (σ2) 0.273 0.212 0.069
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above. With regards to the fifth hypothesis, we find that the stock of refugees has 
no statistically significant effect, while a larger stock of migrants is associated with 
a higher propensity of having diminished solidarity as compared to cosmopolitan 
solidarity, but not compared to extended or exclusive solidarity. Thus, the hypoth-
esis that migration increases the likelihood of diminished solidarity compared to all 
other solidarity types, as proposed by the liberal’s dilemma theory, is not borne out 
by our evidence.
We also fail to find support for the sixth hypothesis: higher inflow of migrants has 
no statistically significant effect on the propensity of holding any type of solidarity. 
As for the final hypothesis, a higher social protection spending is associated with a 
lower propensity of holding cosmopolitan solidarity compared to diminished soli-
darity, whereas the welfare chauvinism theory suggests that higher welfare spending 
will be correlated with higher propensity of having exclusive solidarity compared to 
other types. Therefore, we reject this hypothesis as well. In sum, we find no effect 
of the theoretically relevant contextual variables postulated by the liberal’s dilemma 
and the welfare chauvinism theories, which provides further evidence for ques-
tioning the explanatory power of these theories. Rather, the findings suggest that 
the multidimensional conceptualisation of attitudes towards migration and welfare 
seems to be useful for the analysis of how migration might affect solidarity within 
and across countries.
Conclusion
Informed by the liberal’s dilemma and the welfare chauvinism theories, welfare 
attitudes literature has traditionally viewed migration as a potential hazard to wel-
fare solidarity, and by extension, to the future of European welfare states. In this 
paper, we have argued that such an unidimensional approach to establishing the link 
between attitudes towards migration and the welfare state is not sufficient to cap-
ture the interaction of these two complex phenomena at the individual level. As an 
alternative, we have offered a taxonomy of four different types of solidarity based on 
people’s preferences for public welfare provision and their openness to migrants and 
their social rights. To illustrate the practical usefulness of this taxonomy, we have 
applied LCFA to European Social Survey data.
The results indicate that extended solidarity (strong support for both migration 
and the welfare state) is most widespread as it accounts for 56% of the sample. Fur-
thermore, support for the welfare state is above the midpoint in all other groups as 
well, demonstrating its enduring popularity. However, it should also be stressed that 
the share of people with exclusive solidarity is also high across the sample (28%) 
and that in several countries people with extensive solidarity are a minority despite 
being more numerous than people with other types of solidarity. Hence, the Euro-
pean social-democrats’ quest to simultaneously promote both welfare and migrants’ 
rights is certainly not an easy task, but at least according to public opinion data they 
do not have to fear that their electoral setback will lead to a major retrenchment of 
European welfare states.
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Our results are in sharp contrast with the results of Kulin et al. (2016), even as 
our analysis covers a later point in time and a somewhat different sample. They 
conclude that “for most Europeans, supporting both immigration and welfare is 
unlikely” (p. 1), while we find that more than 50% of Europeans actually do support 
both. This difference is due to several conceptual and methodological shortcomings 
in Kulin and colleagues’ analysis, especially with regards to the operationalisation 
of key concepts, dichotomisation of variables and arbitrary selection of the cut-off 
points. Our study thus shows that addressing these issues leads to a strikingly differ-
ent interpretation that seems much more plausible to us.
Our findings also shed light on key individual characteristics that make people 
more or less likely to belong to one of the four solidarity groups. As expected, urban, 
financially secure, highly educated people and people with higher trust in fellow 
citizens are less likely to have diminished or exclusive solidarity. However, these 
characteristics have very similar effects on the propensity of holding either extended 
or cosmopolitan solidarity and further research is needed to identify the factors that 
contribute to people holding one of these solidarities as opposed to another. Simi-
larly, while our results suggest that the extent of migration and welfare spending are 
not related to the propensity of holding solidarity types as predicted by the liberal’s 
dilemma and the welfare chauvinism theories, more definitive conclusions require 
additional research with larger country samples and preferably longitudinal designs.
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